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Summary findings
Prior analyses  of the relationship  between fiscal  government's  taxing and spending  powers tends to
decentralization  and tine  size of government  treat fiscal  reduce the size of the public  sector.
decentralization  as the decentralization  of either taxing  *  Revenue-sharing  arrangements in which decisions
or spending  powers. But decisions  about taxation and  about taxation are made  by the national government
spending are inseparable.  tend to eliminate the constraining  effect of the
Ehdaie corrects this deficicncy  and analyzes  the effect  decentralized  spending  power.
of simultaneous  decentralization  of taxing and spending  What do these findings  suggest?
powers - "fiscal decentralization"  - on the overall  size  Countries, such as economies  in transition, that want
of the public  sector using cross-country  data.  to reduce the size of the public  sector should decentralize
The econometric results of his study show that:  both taxing and spending decisions.
The simultaneous  decentralization of the national
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Many studies have attempted  a test of the Leviathn hypothesis  [Brennan  and Buchanan
(1980)], that fiscal decentraliztion serves  as a constraint  on the behavior  of revenue-maximizing
governments  and thereby, restrains the overall size of public  sector. Among  others, Oates
(1985), Marlow (1988), Grossman  (1989; 1992),  Jouifaian  and Marlow (1991),  and Kneebone
(1992)  examined  the hypothesis  at the national  government  level. A problem with all of these
studies is that they treat fiscal d  ali  as the decentaliza  of either taxing or spending
powers, neglecting  the inseparability  of taxing  and spending  decisions.'
TMe  present paper argues that fiscal decentralization  in the Leviata  model  of government
is a composit,  constitutional  action contning  the two inseparable  elements  of txig  and
spending  decisions. It then uses inrational  cros-country data to investigate  whether the
simultaneous  decentrlzation  of the national  governmet's  txing  and spending  powers tends to
act as a constraining  influence  on the overall size of public sector. If so, wouldn't revenue
sharing with taxing decisions  concentrated  in the hands of the reverme-maximizing  national
government  circumvent  the constraining  influence  of decentralization  of the spending  power? The
answers are important  for policymakers  in all transition  and many market-oriented  economies  as
governments  often decentralize  their spending  powers while  pursuing  the objective  of a smaller
public sector [for example, Bird and Wallich  (1993)].
2This inseparability  issue was also ignored  by other studies attempted  a test of the hypothesis
at the sate or country govermment  level, for example, Oates (1985), Nelson (1987), Raimondo
(1989), Zax (1989), and Joulfaian  and Marlow (1990).3-
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section deals with the inseparability
of taxing and spending decisions in the Leviathan model of fiscal decentralization, followed by a
brief discussion of the problems with the results of previous studies.  The third section discusses
the empirical model.  The estimation method and empirical results are presented in the fourth
section.  The fifth section is devoted to concluding remarks.
II.  The Leviathan Model of Fiscal Decentralization
Drawing by analogy on the conventional theory of monopoly in the private sector, Brennan
and Buchanan (1980) modelled government as a monolithic entity,  "Leviathan", that
systematically seeks to maximize the total revenues that it extracts from the economy through the
excessive tax-pricing of public goods and services it supplies.  The government's ability to
maximize revenue and hence expenditure, they argue, is limited only by constitutional constraints
placed upon its actions-  One such constraint would be the decentralization of the national
(central) government's taxing and spending powers, with subnational units of government tacing
and spending "independently" [Brennan and Buchanan (1980), 185].
Decntralization  of taxing and spending powers provides taxpayers with options among
"separate taxing-spending jurisdictions".  Through the potential exercise of these options,
taxpayers control the behavior of revenue-maximing  governments along the lines of the Tiebout
(1956) model.  In a Tiebout-style world, any attempt by one jurisdiction to raise the tax price of
local public goods and services it supplies will result in migration of its citizen-taxpayers to an
alternative jurisdiction in the pursuit of fiscal gains.  Interjurisdictional competition for mobile
citizen-taxpayers and other economic resources limits govermnents' excessive tax pricing powers,-4  -
encourages a more cost-efficient production-supply of local public goods and services, and
thereby,  restrains the overall size of the public sector.  In short, the Leviathan model contends
that, other things equal,
"Total government intrusions into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the
greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized  ...... "  [Brennan and
Buchanan (1980), p.  1851.
To further emphasize the ins.parability of tax and expenditure decentralization in their
hypothesis, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argued:  "Possibility for collusion among separate
governmental units .... must be included in 'other things equal'.",  p.  185.  They predicted that,
within the constimtionally dec-ntralized fiscal structure, subnational governments would try to
circumvent competitive pressures through colluding among themselves or with the natonal
governmenL  One obvious collusion would be agreements between subnational governments and
the national government.  Subnational governments would cede taxing powers to the national
government.  National govermment  would establish a revenue-maximizing, uniform tax system
across all jurisdictions.  The tax revenues would be then shared among governments, with
subnational governments receiving their shares in the form of intergovernmental transfers (grants)
according to Grossman (1989).
Revenue sharing, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue, subverts the primary purpose of the
fiscal decentralization, which is to create competition between subnational governments.  It
removes one major element of the competitive government process, i.e.,  tax competition, by
establishing a uniform tax system across jurisdictions and encourages the expansion of the public
sector through the concentration of taxing powers in the hands of the revenue-maximizing-5-
national  government,  circumventing  the constraining  influence  of the expenditure  decentralization.
Each subnational  unit of government  must have responsibility  for raising its own revenue and
should  be precluded  from entering  into revenue sharing  agreements  with the national  or other
subnational  units of government  [Brennan  and Buchanan  (1980),  p.  183]. The inseparability  of
revenue-raising  and spending  responsibilities  at the subnational  level of government  clearly
requires the simultaneous  assigmnent  of the national  government's  taxing  and spending  powers to
subnational  governments.
In short, the Leviathan  model  inplies that, other things  equal, the simultaneous
decentralization  of the national  govermnent's  taxing  and spending  powers, Nfiscal  decentra-
lization", should  act as a constraining  influence  on the overall size of the public sector. 3 And
'other things equal' should include  the simultaneous  transfer of the national  governments revemne
(revenue  sharing)  and assignment  of its spending  power to subnational  units of government,
"fiscal  collusion". The effect  of fiscal collusion  on the public sector size is ambiguous,
depending  on whether the stimulating  effect of revemne  sharing  would  exceed or fall short of the
constraining  influence  of decentralization  of the spending  power.
However, as mentioned  earlier,  -previous  attempts  to conduct an econometric  test of the
fiscal decentralization  hypothesis  at the national  government  level ignored  the simultaneity  of
taxing and spending  decisions,  for example, Dates (1985),  Marlow (1988), Grossman  (1989;
1992),  Joulfaian  and Marlow (1991), and Kneebone  (1992). They measured  fiscal
[de]centalization  by a [de]centralization  ratio of taxing  or spending  powers, i.e., the share of
3Alternative  theories of goverment behavior  supportng this hypothesis  include Richard
Musgrave's (1959)  model of how the distribution  funmtion  of government  would  be carried out by
subnational  governments,  and the more traditional  public choice  models  (for example, Walter
Hettich and Stanley  Winer, 1984).-6  -
[subjnational  goverament[s]  own-tax  revenue in total subnational-national  government  revenues or
the (sub]national  govermnen[s]  sbare of total subnational-national  government  expenditures,  and
collusion  by the ratio of grants to total subnational  governments  own-tax  revenues. 4 In the
context of the Leviathan  model, the coefficient  of the [de]centralization  ratio of taxing  or
spending  powers, alone, has no economic  interpretation  although  it has been used by these studies
as a statistical  criterion to test the fiscal decentralization  hypothesis. Contrary to this hypothesis,
the collusion  variable would  not remain  unchanged  with the extent of fiscal decentralization. As
an inseparable  component  of fiscal decentralization,  the extent of decentralization  of taxing
powers  would automatically  cause an increase  in suboational  governments  own-tax  revenues  and
thus a decrease  in the collusion  variable.
The present paper extends  the existing  literature, treating  fiscal decenrtalization  as the
simultaneous  decentralization  of the government's  taxing  and spending  powers-
M.  The Emipirical  Model
The Leviathan  model  predicts that, other things  equal, the overall size of the public  sector
should inversely  vary with the extent of simultaneous  decenltrlization  of the national
government's  taxing  and spending  decisions  (fiscal  decentralization).  Furthermore, "other things
equal" should include the simultaneous  transfer  of the national  government's  revenue and of its
spending  powers to subnational  governments  (fiscal  collusion).  Accordingly,  this paper defines
'Regarding  the collusion  variable, Oates (1985)  used the ratio of grants over subnational
govermnents  revenues  for intergovernmental  grants  but did not discuss  possibility  for collusion
among  governments. Marlow (1988)  ignored  collusion. Grossman  (1989)  dealt with collusion
but used Oates' (1985) grant variable  as a measure of collusion.  Other studies adopted
Grossman's collusion  variable.-7  -
the measure of fiscal decentralization,  'FIS  DEC', as the ratio of total subnational  governments
own-source  revenues  used to finance  their expenditures  to total subnational-national  government
expenditures. FIS_DEC  varies only with the extent  of simultaneous  [delcentralization  of the
national government's  taxing  and spending  powers.  Its variation  excludes  changes in the
decentralization  degree  of expenditures  fianced  through  sources  other than the subnational
govermnents  own-source  revenues.
As a measure of fiscal collusion,  "FPS COLQ,  this paper uses the ratio of the national
govermnent's  revenues  transferred  to subnational  governments  over total subnational-national
govermnent  expenditures. FIS COL only varies with the variation  of simultaneous  transfer of
the national government's  revenue and assignment  of its spending  responsibility  to subnational
governments. It remains  fixed with the extent of fiscal [delcentralization. FIS DEC and
IS  COL are independent,  policy  variables.
The present paper adopts  the measure of public-sector  size, PUB_SIZ,  employed  by
Marlow (1988), Grossman  (1989; 1992),  Joulfaian  and Marlow (1991), and Kneebone  (1992).
PIJB_SIZ is defined  as the total general government  expenditures  share of gross domestic
products.
To test the fiscal decentralization  hypothesis,  the level (or growth) of PUB SIZ are
assumed  to be related  to the level (or growth) of FIS_DEC,  FIS COL and a set of other control
variables,  "Z",  as follows:
PUB SIZ  =a 0 +a1 FISDEC  + aFISCOL  + C 3 Z+U  (1)
or-8 -
PUB  SIZ' =  a  +  a1FIS  DEC  +  a2FiS  COL*  +  a3Zx +  U7  (2)
where
PUB SIZ =  ratio of total national-subnational  government  expenditures  to GDP;
FIS DEC =  ratio of total subnational  governments  own-source  revenues
over total national-subnational  govermnent  expenditures;-
FIS COL =  ratio of the national  government's  revenues  transferred  to
subnational  governments  over total nationl-subnational  govemment
expenditures;
Z =  asector  of other control  variables;
U =  disturbance terms;
and superscript  asterisks  in equation  (2) refer to the growth rate of variables.
Equations (1) and (2) are similar to the estimatn  equations  employed  by previous studies
with exception  of the measurements  of the FIS DEC, FIS COL, FIS DEC. and FIS COL.
Tfhe  Leviadtan  fiscal decentralization  hypothesis  implies al <  0.  The sign of a2 may be
positive or negative, depeding on whether  the stimulating  effect of transfer of the national
government's  revenue to subnational  govemments  (revenue  sharing)  on the size of the public
sector would exceed or fall short of the constraining  influence  of the decentralized  expenditures
financed  through revenue-transfers. The positive  sign of a2  regardless  of its significance  level
would indicate  that revenue sharing  with taxing  decisions  concentrated  in the hands of revenue-
maximizing  national government  exterminates  the constraining  influence  of decentalinztion  of the
spending  power, providing  further  support for the Leviathan  model.-9-
To control for the influence  of other variables, the present paper follows Oates' (1985)
international  cross-country  analysis and uses gross domestic  product  per capita at the constant
1987 US dollar, "GDP-PER", for Wagner's Law and total population  or the share of urban
population  in total population, "URB POP", as a scale variable. According  to Wagner's law,
demand  for public  goods and services  is more incomelastic  than  demand for private goods,and
services, implying  a positive relationship  between  PUB_SIZ,  the demand  for public goods-
services  relative  to total demand  for public-private  goods-services,  and GDP PER.  GDP PER
also controls for the positive effect of econoniic  development  on the size of the public sector.
The more developed  (industrialized)  a country, the higher would  be its GDP per capita and thus
public-sector  size.  As regards the effect  of scale variable, Oates (1985)  has argued  that the more
urbanized or populated  a state, the smaller should  be its public sector, reflecting  some  economies
in providing  services  to more densely  populated  areas.  The counter-hypothesis  argues that
growth of urban or total population  would  increase  demand  for public  services, encouraging  the
expansion  of the public sector, for example,  Kneebone  (1992).5
17. Estimation Methods and Emipirical  Results
The information  on public finances  in the ID  Government  Fiancial  Statistics  Yearbook
(1992)  were used to assemble  measares of PUB_SIZ,  FIS DEC and FIS COL for a sample  of 30
countries  in 1987, the most recent year which  provided  the largest size of sample  (30), and 1977,
the earliest  year for which data were available  for the most of countries  in the sample (26).
5It might be argued  that inclusion  of some  exogenous  variables  in the model may improve the
explanatory  power of the equations. But the purpose of this paper is to provide an extension  of
the earlier studies.- 10-
Growth rates of these  measures  over the 1977-87  period were used to generate  cross-country  data
for PUB SIZ,  FISC DEC  and FIS COLO. The longer the period, the more would be the
variation in these growth rates across countries. Data for other variables  were extracted  from
World Tables (1992). The list of countries  can be found in the appendix.
Equations  (l) and (2) were, respectively,  estimated  using die level of variables  in .1977  and
1987  and their 1977-87  growth rates by means of least-squares  method (Table 1).6 Consistent
with the Leviathan  model, coefficient  of fiscal-decentralization  variable is negative  in all of the
equations. But the results are suspect due to the presence  of a serious  degree of multicollinearity
according  to Klien's rule (1962). In all of the equations,  multiple  correlation  coefficient  of the
dependent  variable (Y) with all independent  variables  (X), "R 2
3,11 1 ,", falls short of  umltiple
correlation  coefficient  of at least one independent  variable  with all other independent  variables,
-"R 2xi.og,xs".- Such a serious  degree of multicolinearity  could affect the sign or size of the
parameters  which are crucial  for the purpose of this  -study.
A step-wise  regression  procedure  was employed  to search for the source of
multicolinearity. The scale variable was found to be the major cause of multicollinearity  in all
of the equations,  capturing  the effects of other explanatory  variables  without  making a significant
contribution  to the variation  of the public-sector  size. This variable, which  was not important  for
6Foliowing  Oates (1985), equation  (1) was also estimated  using a logistic transformation  of
the dependent  variable to allow the dependent  variable  to range over the whole set of real
number.  consistent  with Oates' findings,  the results were remarkably  similar  to those without  the
transformation;  therefore, those  presented  here do not make use of the logistic  transformation. In
addition  to GDP per capita, the present  paper also used dummy  variable, ons for industrial  and
zero for developing  countries,  to capture the effect of development  on the overall size of public
sector; its coefficient  was found to be of insignificant  in explaining  variation of the public-sector
size.
'For more details about the effect of multicollinearity  on the signs and sizes of the
parameters, see: Maddala  (1977), P. 185.- 11  -
Table 1.  Estimation Results
Equation  (1)  Equation  (2)
hId. var.2 .1977  1987  -Id.  var.2 1977-87
FIS DEC  -0.2592  -0.2714  FIS DEC*  -0.0805
(-1.15)  (-1.23)  (-1.13)
[0.412]  [0.333]  [0.130]
FIS COL  0.0102  0.1672  FIS_COL'  0.0004
(0.050)  (0.57)  (0.366)
[0.123]  (0.029  - [0.048]
GDP_PER  0.0141  0.0109  GDP PER!  -0.6151
(2.12)  (2.39)  (-1.79)
[0.6441  [0.514]  [0.261]
URB POP  0.0019  0.0019  URB PPOV  0.2219
(1.04)  (1.21)  (0.667)
[0.5241]  [0.359]  [0.112]
CONSTANT  0.1673  0.2199  CONSTANV  0.2405"
(2.44)  (2.91)  (2.63)
F  5-.97.  4.36  F  1.50
R2  0.57  0.45  0.25
Adj.R'  0.48  0.39  Adj. R2  0.08
1  Dependent  variable is the total subnational-national  government  expenditures  share of
GDP in  equation (1) and its 1977-87 growth rate in equation (2).  Within the
parentheses  are t-statistics. Within  the brackets  are the multiple  correlaton coefficient
of each independent  vanable  with all other  independent  variables  included  in the model.
1.  .
2  FI5_DEC  = total  subnational  governments  own-source  revenues  over total subnational-
national government  expenditures;  PIS_COL =  the national government's  revenues
tr-ansferred  to  subnational  governments  over total subational-national  government
expenditures;  GDP PER = GDP per capita  at constant  1987  $US (1000); URBEPOP
t  the share of urban  population  in total population  (%). Superscript  s  s refer to the
197747 growth  rates.- 12 -
the purpose  of this paper, was excluded  from all of the equations  and the equations  were re-
estimated  (Table  2).
Test  of hypotheses  about the parameters,  which  are also crucial  for the purpose of this
study, would  be suspect  with th- presence  of heteroscedasticity,  and endogeneity  of fiscal
decentralization  and collusion  variables. Heteroscedasticity  is often  encountered  in cross-section
data.  A test for homoscedasticity  was conducted  using Glejser's  (1969)  procedure. The test
results, which  can be found  in the appendix,  reject the alternative  hypothesis  in all of the
equations,  that heteroscedasticity  exists. Finally,  the overall  size of public  sector might
endogenously  influence  fiscal  decentralization  and collusion  (independent  variables),  creating
correlation  between these  independent  variables  and error terms. This problem  may emerge  from
certain  government  activities  which  require or imply  a national  government  role, e.g., military
spending. Growth of these government  activities  and consequently  the overall size .of  public
sector may cause declining  fiscal decentralization  and coilusion. To address  this matter, equation
(1) was estmated using instrument  variable  tchnique.  The estdmtion results, which.are
presented  m the appendix,  were remarkably  similar to the LS ones, indicating  that fiscal
decentralization  and fiscal collusion  variables  are independent  of the public-sector  size and
consequently  error terms.
Table  2 reports  the final estimation  results. The explanatory  power  of equation  (1), in both
1977  and 1987, is higher than the explanatory  power of equation  (2), with the former explaining
almost  70 percent of total variations  in the overall  size of public  sector. Consistent  with
Wagner's  Law,:  the level of per capita  GDP (GDP PER) has a positive  and statstically
significant  association  with the level of the public  sector size (PUB_SIZ)  in both 1977  and 1987.- 13 -
Table  2.  The Estimation Results: After Exluding the Scale
Variable 1
Equation (1)  Equation (2)
Ind. var.2 1977  1987  Ind.  var.2  1977-87 In.  va.17719
FIS DEC  -0.3378  -0.2788a  FIS DEC*  -0.0957
(-1.52)  (-1.38)  (-1.44)
[0.371]  [0.332]  [0.130]
FIS  COL  0.0571  0.2049-  FIS  COL  0.0003
(0.26)  (0.74)  (0.28)
[0.105]  [0-023]  [0.038]
GDP  PER  0.0208  0.0136b  GDP PER'  -0.6781a
(4.38)  (3.80)  (-1.80)
[0.309]  [0.3361  [0.001]
CONSTANT  0.2423b  0.3172"  CONSTANr  0.2649b
(5.24)  (7.57)  (3.21)
F  6.79  5.68  F  1.91
0.54  0.44  R  0.23
Adj.R2 0.46  0.37  Adj. R 2 0.11
1  Dependent variable is total subnational-national  government expenditures share of GDP
in equation (1) and  its 1977-87 growth rate in equation (2).  Within the parentheses are
t-statistics.  Within  the  brackets  are  the  multiple correlation  coefficient  of  each
independent vanable with all other independent variables included in the model.
2  FIS_DEC =  total subnational governments own-source revenues over total subnational-
national government expenditures; FIS_COL =  the national government's revenues
transferred to  subnational governments over total  subnational-national govermuent
expenditures; GDP_PER =  GDP per capita at constant 1987 $US (1000).  Superscript
s refer to the 1977-87 growth rates.
a  Significant at the  90. percent probability level,  one-tail test for  the coefficients of
RS  DEC and FIS-DEC.
b  Significant at 95 percent probability level.-14-
As hypothesized,  fiscal decentralization  (FIS DEC and FIS DEC') exerts a negative
influence  on the size of the public sector in all of the equations,  being significantly  different from
zero at the above 90 percent  probability  level.
Finally, coefficient  of fiscal-collusion  variable (FIS_COL  and FIS COL) in all of the
equations  is positive but not significantly  different  from zero.  This result, which is consistent
with the Leviathan  model, indicates  that the stimulating  effect  of transfer  of the national
government's  revenue to subnational  goverments (revenue  sharing)  significantly  neutralizes  the
constraining  influence  of the decentralized  expenditures  financed  through  revenue-transfers.
V.  Conclusion.
Earlier attempts  to examine  the relation  between  fiscal decentralization  and goverment
size treat fiscal decentralization  as the decentralization  of either taxing or spending  powers,
neglecting  the inseparability  of taxing  and spending  decisions  which makes interpretation  of the
results in the context of the model  difficult. The present  paper extends the existing  literature,
arguing that fiscal decentralization  is a composite,  constitutional  action containing  the two
inseparable  elements  of taxing  and spending  decisions. It ten  employs  an econometric  model to
investigate  the effect of fiscal decentalization  on the overall size of public  sector using
intenational cross-country  data.
The empirical  results show that (i) the simultaneous  decentralization  of the national
govermnent's  taxing and spending  powers  exerts a negative  and significant  influence  on the
overall size of public sector; and (ii) revenue sharing with taxing decisions  concentrated  in the
hands of national government  eliminates  the negative influence  of decentralization  of the spending
power.
These findings  suggest  that the counties pursuing  the objective  of a smaller public.  sector
but just decentalizing their spending  powers should  decentralize  their taxing  decisions  as well.-15  -
APPENDIX
The Test Results for Homoscedasticity-H.:  au=O.
t-statistics  for uos'
Equations:  e  =o0+Evjxj  e J  =aOr+qfxi  e*  =crO+Ecax'  e'  ao+ayx
- xis  - 1977  1987  1977  1987  1977-87  1977-87
Formn  A:
FIS  DEC  -1.0  0.11  -1.3  0.91  0.57  0.67
FIS  COL  -1.03  -1.11  -1.29  -1.28  -0.51  -0.63
GDP PER  0.39  1.31  0.54  1.73  -0.78  -0-78
Form B:
FIS_DEC  1.09  0.65  -1.26  0.87  -0.59  -0.63
FIS COL  0.41  -0.79  0.41  -0.67  0.35  0.34
-
GDP PER  -1.17  -0.18  -0.40  0.77  -0.78  -0.78
Form C:
ffIS.DEC  -1.26  -0.27  -1.34  -0.63  0.98  -0.58
/rF1iCOU  -0.89  -0.72  -1.13  -0.85  -0.52  -0.39
/GDPLPER  -0.79  -1.18  -0.27  -1.73  -1.02  -1.25
x, is the 1977-87  growth rate of x  . e  =  absolute  values of die OLS estimates  of errors
in equations  (1) for 1977 and 1987;  e*  !--absolute  values  of the OLS estimates  of errors in
equation (2).-16-
Estimation  Results Using Instrument
Variable Technique'
Id.  variables  1977  1987
FIS DEC  -0.3648  -0.2956a
(-1.58) 0  (-1.34)
FIS COL  0.0724  0.2252
(0.42)  (0.76)
GDP PER  0.0214  0.139b
(4.43)  (3.71)
CONSTANT  0.2405b  0.3175b
(5.19)  (7.43)
F  6.81  5.31
0.52  0.45
Adj.R 2 0.41  0.39
* Lagged FIS_DEC and FIS_COL were used as instrument  variables.
2  Significant  at 90 percent probability  level, one-tail  test for
FISC_DEC.
b  Significant  at 95 percent probability  level.
List of countries:
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Chile  Finland  France  Germany  - Hungary.
India  Ireland  Israel  Italy  Japan
Kenya  Luxembourg  Malaysia  Mexico  Netherlands
Norway  Paraguay,  Poland  Romnania  South Africa.
Spain  Sweden  Thailand  UK  US- 17 -
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